

**LATIN AMERICA'S NEW SECURITY REALITY:
IRREGULAR ASYMMETRIC CONFLICT
AND HUGO CHAVEZ**

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FOREWORD

In 2005, Dr. Max Manwaring wrote a monograph entitled *Venezuela's Hugo Chavez, Bolivarian Socialism, and Asymmetric Warfare*. It came at a time when the United States and Venezuela were accelerating a verbal sparring match regarding which country was destabilizing Latin America more. The rhetoric continues. Moreover, President Chavez shows no sign of standing down; he slowly and deliberately centralizes his power in Venezuela, and carefully and adroitly articulates his Bolivarian dream (the idea of a Latin American Liberation Movement against U.S. economic and political imperialism). Yet, most North Americans dismiss Chavez as a “nut case,” or—even if he is a threat to the security and stability of the Hemisphere—the possibilities of that threat coming to fruition are too far into the future to worry about.

Thus, Dr. Manwaring’s intent in this new monograph is to explain in greater depth what President Chavez is doing and how he is doing it. First, he explains that Hugo Chavez’s threat is straightforward, and that it is being translated into a consistent, subtle, ambiguous, and ambitious struggle for power that is beginning to insinuate itself into political life in much of the Western Hemisphere. Second, he shows how President Chavez is encouraging his Venezuelan and other followers to pursue a confrontational, populist, and nationalistic agenda that will be achieved only by (1) radically changing the traditional politics of the Venezuelan state—and other Latin American states—to that of “direct” (totalitarian) democracy; (2) destroying North American hegemony throughout all of Latin America by conducting an irregular Fourth-Generation

War “Super Insurgency”; and, (3) country-by-country, building a great new Bolivarian state out of a phased Program for the Liberation of Latin America.

This timely monograph contributes significantly to understanding the new kinds of threats characteristic of a world in which instability and irregular conflict are no longer on the margins of global politics. For those responsible for making and implementing national security policy in the United States, the rest of the Western Hemisphere, and elsewhere in the world, this analysis is compelling. The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this monograph as part of the ongoing debate on global and regional security and stability.


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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

MAX G. MANWARING is Professor of Military Strategy and holds the General Douglas MacArthur Chair of Research at the U.S. Army War College, and is an Adjunct Professor of Political Science at Dickinson College. He is a retired U.S. Army colonel and has served in various military and civilian positions, including at the U.S. Army War College, U.S. Southern Command, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the University of Memphis. Dr. Manwaring is the author and co-author of several articles, chapters, and reports dealing with political-military affairs, and global and regional security concerns. He is the editor or coeditor of inter alia, *El Salvador at War*, 1988; *Gray Area Phenomena: Confronting the New World Disorder*, 1993; *Managing Contemporary Conflict: Pillars of Success*, 1996; *Beyond Declaring Victory and Coming Home: The Challenges of Peace and Stability Operations*, 2000; and *The Search for Security: A U.S. Grand Strategy for the Twenty-First Century*, 2003; and co-author, with John T. Fishel, of *Uncomfortable Wars Revisited*, University of Oklahoma Press, 2006. Dr. Manwaring holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Illinois and is a graduate of the U.S. Army War College.

SUMMARY

Since his election as President of Venezuela in 1998, Hugo Chavez has encouraged and continues to encourage his Venezuelan and other Latin American followers to pursue a confrontational “defensive,” populist, and nationalistic agenda that will supposedly liberate Latin America from the economic dependency and the political imperialism of the North American “Colossus” (the United States). Chavez argues that liberation, New Socialism, and *Bolivarianismo* (the dream of a Latin American Liberation Movement against U.S. hegemony) will only be achieved by (1) radically changing the traditional politics of the Venezuelan state to that of “direct” (totalitarian) democracy; (2) destroying North American hegemony throughout all of Latin America by (3) conducting an irregular and asymmetric “Super Insurgency,” or “Fourth-Generation Warfare” to depose the illegitimate external enemy; and, 4) building a new Bolivarian state, beginning with Venezuela and extending to the whole of Latin America.

This is not the rhetoric of a “nut case.” It is, significantly, the rhetoric of an individual who is performing the traditional and universal Leninist-Maoist function of providing a strategic vision and the operational plan for gaining revolutionary power. In pursuit of this Bolivarian dream, Chavez has stirred the imaginations of many Latin Americans – especially the poor. Additionally, he has aroused the imaginations of many other interested observers around the world. And now, Hugo Chavez is providing political leaders – populists and neo-populists, new socialists, disillusioned revolutionaries, and oppositionists, and

submerged *nomenklaturas* worldwide— with a relatively orthodox and sophisticated Marxist-Leninist-Maoist model for the conduct and implementation of an irregular “Super Insurgency.” Interestingly, this kind of war is the only type of conflict the United States has ever lost. It is surprising and dismaying that the world’s only superpower does not have a unified political-military strategy and a multidimensional interagency organizational structure to confront Chavez’s challenge. It is time to make substantive changes to deal better with irregular contemporary conflict.

LATIN AMERICA'S NEW SECURITY REALITY: IRREGULAR ASYMMETRIC CONFLICT AND HUGO CHAVEZ

War no longer exists. Confrontation, conflict, and combat undoubtedly exist all around the world—most noticeably, but not only, in Iraq, Afghanistan, The Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the Palestinian Territories—and states still have armed forces which they use as a symbol of power. *Nonetheless, war as cognitively known to most noncombatants, war as a battle in a field between men and machinery, war as a massive deciding event in a dispute in international affairs: such war no longer exists.*¹

The author of this statement, General Sir Rupert Smith (United Kingdom [UK]), has the experience and understanding to explain further: “The old paradigm was that of interstate industrial war. The new one is the paradigm of war amongst peoples. . . .”² This new paradigm involves strategic confrontation among a range of combatants, not all of which are armies. In these terms, war among peoples reflects some hard facts:

- Combatants are not necessarily armies; they tend to be small groups of armed soldiers who are not necessarily uniformed, not necessarily all male but also female, and not necessarily all adults but also children;
- These small groups of combatants tend to be interspersed among ordinary people and have no permanent locations and no identity to differentiate them clearly from the rest of a given civil population;
- There is no secluded battlefield far away from population centers upon which armies engage;

- Armed engagements may take place anywhere – in the presence of civilians, against civilians, and in defense of civilians;
- Combatants use differing types of low-tech weapons that are sometimes improvised yet always effective;
- Combat or confrontation uses not only coercive military force but also co-optive political and psychological persuasion;
- Conflicts are conducted at four levels – political, strategic, operational (theater), and tactical – with each level sitting within the context of the other in descending order from the political;
- Contemporary conflict is now lengthy and evolves through two or three or more noncoercive organizational stages before serious coercion and confrontation come into play;
- Even then, military operations are only one of the many instruments of power employed by the combatants;
- Conflict is often transnational, in that combatants use legal political frontiers and other countries' territories for sanctuary, staging areas, and rest and recuperation;
- The major military and nonmilitary battles in modern conflict take place among the people; when they are reported, they become media events that may or may not reflect social reality;
- All that is done is intended to capture the imaginations of the people and the will of their leaders, thereby winning a trial of moral (not military) strength; and,

- The struggle is total, in that it gives the winner absolute power to control or replace an entire existing government or other symbol of power.³

These are the principal characteristics of what President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela now calls “4th Generation War” (4GW), “Asymmetric War,” “Guerra de todo el pueblo (“War of all the People,” “People’s War,” or “War Among Peoples”).⁴ President Chavez asserts that this type of conflict has virtually unlimited possibilities for a “Super Insurgency” against the United States in the 21st century. It appears that Chavez’s revolutionary (Bolivarian) ideas are developing and maturing, and that he and Venezuela, at a minimum, are developing the conceptual and physical capabilities to challenge the status quo in the Americas. This challenge is straightforward and is being translated into a constant, subtle, ambiguous struggle for power that is beginning to insinuate itself into political life in much of the Western Hemisphere.⁵

In pursuit of his Bolivarian dream, Chavez has stirred the imaginations of many Latin Americans—especially the poor. Additionally, he has aroused the imaginations of many other interested observers around the world. And, now, Chavez is providing political leaders—populists and neo-populists, new socialists and disillusioned revolutionaries, and submerged *nomenklaturas* worldwide—with a relatively orthodox and sophisticated Marxist-Leninist-Maoist model for the conduct and implementation of a successful, regional 4GW “Super Insurgency.”⁶ Interestingly and importantly, Colonel Thomas X. Hammes reminds us that this is the only kind of war the United States has ever lost.⁷

Thus, the conscious choices civil-military leadership in the international community and individual nation-states make about how to counter Hugo Chavez—or anyone else intending to engage in contemporary, asymmetric 4GW—will define the processes of national, regional, and global security, stability, and well-being far into the future. As a consequence, until we recognize the need to change our fundamental thought patterns (mindsets) and organizational structures in order to deal effectively with this overwhelming reality, we will make little substantive progress toward achieving success in our current confrontations and conflicts.⁸

The strategic relevance and imperative of this monograph, then, is to transmit some of the hard-learned lessons of the past and present to current and future strategic leaders. These leaders will be solving the next big set of security problems in the 21st century, and they must think about contemporary irregular conflict from multiple angles, at multiple levels, and in varying degrees of complexity. The intent of this monograph, then, is to (1) outline some salient 4GW challenges, (2) sketch the bases for broadening the concepts of national security and effective sovereignty within the context of 4GW, (3) review the bases for Chavez's Bolivarian state, his notion of irregular 4GW (Super Insurgency), and his ambitious ideas for the liberation of Latin America, (4) propose a populace-oriented model for contemporary threat and response, and (5) make a recommendation regarding, "What is to be done—first?"

4GW CHALLENGES: BROADENING THE CONCEPTS OF THREAT AND CONFLICT

The legal-traditional concept of threat to national security and sovereignty primarily involves the

protection of national territory, citizens, and vital interests abroad against external military aggression.⁹ Accordingly, the legal-traditional concept tends to define threats to national security and sovereignty in relatively narrow, obvious, nation-state, and military terms. The more contemporary, nontraditional security dialogue tends to define threats in broader, subtler, more ambiguous terms that enhance real and popular perceptions of relative stability and well-being. Stability and well-being tend to refer to the use of a variety of means—only one of which is military—in the pursuit of political, economic, and social objectives. In turn, enemies can be traditional nation-states; nontraditional, external nonstate (small groups and individuals) actors or proxies; and/or violent nontraditional intrastate actors that might threaten the achievement of those broader objectives and the vitality of the state. As a result, the enemy is not necessarily a recognizable military entity that has an industrial/technical capability to make war. At base, the enemy now becomes any individual or group, state or nonstate political actor who plans and implements (1) the kinds of violence that create or exploit instability, (2) actions that inhibit legitimate governmental control of the national territory and the people in it, and (3) other threats to the national well-being. As a result, threats to national security and sovereignty are now being defined in more complex, ambiguous, and multidimensional terms.¹⁰

Where the Complex, Ambiguous, and Multidimensional Threat Environment Leads.

Contemporary threats to national stability, sovereignty, and well-being are not necessarily direct attacks on a government. They are, however, proven

means for weakening governing regimes. These new threats reflect a logical progression from the problems of institutional and state weaknesses, and, in turn, move the threat spectrum from traditional state to nontraditional nonstate actors.¹¹ That progression further infers that several small, weak states in the Caribbean and Latin America are at serious risk of failure to perform their sovereign governance and security functions. Colombia's Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), Peru's Sendero Luminoso, and other insurgents call activities that facilitate or accelerate the processes of state failure and generate greater freedom of movement and action for themselves "armed propaganda." Drug cartels operating in the Andean Ridge of South America and elsewhere call these kinds of activities "business incentives." Thus, in addition to helping to provide wider latitude to further their causes, insurgent and other violent nonstate actors' armed propaganda and business incentives are aimed at lessening a regime's credibility and capability in terms of its ability and willingness to govern, to develop its national territory and populace, and to provide general well-being.¹² The problems of governance take us to the real threat engendered by personal and collective insecurity together with diminishing national stability and sovereignty—that is, state failure.

The state failure (destabilization) process tends to move from personal violence to increased collective violence and social disorder to kidnappings, bank robberies, violent property takeovers, murders/assassinations, personal and institutional corruption, criminal anarchy, and internal and external population displacements. In turn, the momentum of this process of violence tends to evolve into more widespread social

violence, serious degradation of the economy, and diminished governmental capabilities of providing personal and collective security and guaranteeing the rule of law to all citizens. Then, using complicity, intimidation, corruption, and indifference, an irregular political actor or nonstate group can quietly and subtly co-opt politicians, bureaucrats, and security personnel to gain political control of a given piece of the national territory. The individual or nonstate group that takes control of a series of networked pieces of such “ungoverned territory” can then become a dominant political actor (warlord) and destabilizer, and/or a state within a state or a group of states.¹³

Somewhere near the end of the destabilization process, the state will be able to control less and less of its national territory and fewer and fewer of the people in it. Nevertheless, just because a state fails does not mean that it will simply go away. The diminishment of responsible governance and personal security generate greater poverty, violence, and instability – and a downward spiral in terms of development and well-being. It is a zero-sum game in which nonstate or individual actors (such as insurgents, transnational criminal organizations, or corrupt public officials) are the winners, and the rest of the targeted society are the losers. Ultimately, failing or failed states become dysfunctional states, dependent on other states or international organizations, tribal states, rogue states, criminal states, narco-states, “new people’s republics,” draconian states (military dictatorships), or neo-populist states (civilian dictatorships). Moreover, failing or failed states may dissolve and become parts of other states or may reconfigure into entirely new entities.¹⁴

However, if misguided political dreams were to come true, Osama bin Laden would see the artificial

boundaries of the Muslim Middle East and North Africa turn into caliphates reminiscent of the glory days of the 12th and 13th centuries.¹⁵ And Hugo Chavez would witness the metamorphosis of 15 or 20 Latin American republics into one great American nation.¹⁶ Experience demonstrates, however, that most of these political dreams never come true. Ultimately, the international community must pay the indirect social, economic, and political costs of state failure. Accordingly, the current threat environment in the Western Hemisphere is not a traditional security problem, but it is no less dangerous. The consistency of these kinds of experiences throughout the world, and over time, inspires confidence that these lessons are valid.¹⁷

Linking Security, Stability, Development, Responsible Governance, and Sovereignty.

In terms of national security and sovereignty equating national well-being, it is helpful to examine the linkage among security, stability, development, democracy, and sovereignty. This linkage involves the circular nature of the interdependent relationships among security, stability and development, governance and peace, and effective sovereignty. Finding solutions to this set of issues takes the international community or individual intervening actors beyond providing some form of humanitarian assistance in cases of human misery and need. It takes international political powers beyond traditional monitoring of bilateral agreements or protecting a people from another group of people (nonstate actor) or from a government. It takes nation-state actors and international organizations beyond compelling one or more parties to a conflict to cease

human rights abuses and other morally repugnant practices or repelling some form of conventional military aggression.

An elaboration on the security-insecurity process will establish two things. First, it will clarify the fact that some issues now considered singular law enforcement problems are broader threats to the nation and its sovereignty. Second, such an analysis will provide a logical foundation for an examination of the nontraditional notion of conflict. However, most directly, solutions to the problems of stability and well-being take us to five highly interrelated and reinforcing lessons that the international community should have learned by now.¹⁸

The Relationship of Security to Stability. Security begins with the provision of personal protection to individual members of the citizenry. It then extends to protection of the collectivity from violent, internal nonstate actors, and external nonstate and state enemies (including organized criminals, self-appointed reformers, vigilante groups, and external enemies, and, in some cases, from repressive local and regional governments). Additionally, security depends on the continued and expanded building of a country's socioeconomic infrastructure. Then, in the context of socioeconomic development, facilitated by the establishment and maintenance of legitimate law and order (political development), a governing regime can deliberately begin to build the political-socioeconomic infrastructure that will generate national well-being and stability. In turn, through providing personal and collective security to the citizenry, the state can begin to exercise de facto as well as de jure sovereignty (the effective legal authority over a body politic).¹⁹ The reasoning is straightforward – the security that enables

political and economic development has a decisive bearing on establishing internal order, enhancing national well-being and stability, developing national and regional power, and, therefore, securing internal and external peace.²⁰

The Relationship of Stability to Development. In the past, developed countries generally provided economic and financial aid to developing countries, under the assumption that personal and collective security and political development would automatically follow. That has not happened. Experience teaches that coherent, long-term, multilevel, and multilateral capability-building measures must be designed to create and strengthen human and state infrastructure. At the same time, these measures must generate the technical, professional, and ethical bases through which competent and honest political leadership can effectively provide individual and collective well-being. In the context of political-socioeconomic development, facilitated by the establishment of legitimate law and order, a responsible governing regime can begin to develop sustainable peace and prosperity.²¹

The Relationship of Development to Responsible Governance. The relationship of sustainable development to responsible governance relies on morally legitimate government. Legitimate government is essential for generating the capability to manage, coordinate, and sustain security, stability, and development effectively. This capability implies competent, honest leaders who can govern responsibly and who also have the political competence to engender a national and international purpose to which citizens can relate and support. Clearly, the reality of corruption at any level of government favoring any special interest militates against responsible governance and the public well-

being. Unless and until a population perceives that its government deals with issues of personal security, well-being, and development fairly and effectively, the potential for internal or external forces to destabilize and subvert a regime is considerable. Regimes that ignore this lesson often find themselves in a “crisis of governance.” They face increasing social violence, criminal anarchy, terrorism, insurgency, and overthrow.²²

The Relationship of Responsible Governance to Sovereignty. Responsible democracy and political legitimacy are based upon the moral right of a government to govern and the ability of the regime to govern morally. The operative term here is “to govern morally.” This depends on the culture and mores of the community of people being governed and, basically, depends on peoples’ perceptions. Globally, when people perceive their governments to be corrupt and their countries’ socioeconomic conditions as disenfranchisement, poverty, lack of upward social mobility, and lack of personal security, those governments have limited rights and abilities to conduct the business of the state. As a government loses the right and ability to govern fairly and morally – according to the local culture – it loses legitimacy. In turn, the loss of moral legitimacy leads to the degeneration of de facto state sovereignty. That is, the state no longer exercises effective control of the national territory and the people in it.²³

From Sovereignty Back to Security. Again, a fundamental societal requirement for acceptance and approval of state authority (sovereignty) is that a government must ensure individual and collective security. The security problem ends with the establishment of firm but fair control of the entire national territory and the people in it, which takes us back to the concept

of sovereignty. That is, without exercising complete control of the national territory, a government cannot provide the elements that define the notion of effective sovereignty. In this context, a government's failure to extend an effective sovereign presence throughout its national territory leaves a vacuum in which gangs, drug cartels, leftist and religious insurgents, the political and narco-Right, warlords, another "1,000 snakes," and various alternative governments may all compete for power—and contribute substantially to the processes of state failure. In that connection, a government's failure to control the national territory precludes its ability to protect citizens against violence, conduct an effective judicial system, uphold the rule of law, plan long-term development, carry through responsible political processes, and maintain sustainable peace.²⁴

Linking the various elements of stability and sovereignty is a matter of combining different efforts whose only common trait is that they cannot be resolved by a single instrument of state power, or even by a single government. This analysis gives substantive meaning to the argument that contemporary conflict (such as Chavez's 4GW) is more than a military-to-military confrontation and that all instruments of state and international power must be utilized to achieve a result or end-state that equates to sustainable peace. In this new global security environment, war can be everywhere and can involve everybody and everything. This represents a sea change in warfare and requires nothing less than a paradigm change in how conflict is conceived and managed. But, first, it is useful to examine the transformation of conflict.

THE TRANSFORMATION AND BROADENING OF THE NOTION OF CONFLICT

Osama bin Laden and al-Qai'da abruptly and violently contradicted the traditional ideas that war is the purview of the state and that nonstate and irregular ways and means of conducting contemporary war were simple aberrations.²⁵ In these terms, al-Qai'da demonstrated that a nonstate actor could effectively challenge a traditional nation-state—and indeed the symbols of power in the global system—and pursue its strategic political objectives without conventional weaponry or manpower. At the same time, al-Qai'da illustrated that nonstate actors and their actions can be constantly mutating. As a result, adversaries in conflict have changed, purposes and motives of conflict have changed, and means to pursue conflict have changed. Moreover, as the means of conducting war (conflict) have changed, the battlefields expand, overlap, move about, and become increasingly complex and anarchical. Thus, conflict is now without frontiers or enforceable controls. Additionally, the center of gravity is no longer an “enemy” military formation or the industrial-logistical ability to conduct conflict; instead, it is public opinion and leadership, a lesson from Clausewitz.²⁶ This takes us to General Smith's conclusion that conflict, the power to conduct conflict, and the power to destroy or radically change nation-states are not so much based upon military power as on political and psychological power.²⁷ Former Lieutenant Colonel Chavez understands all this—and more. Understanding this new sociology of conflict takes us to another five lessons that other strategic leaders should have learned by now.

Adversaries Have Changed.

Conflict is no longer only an instrument of state action, but also of small groups and individual actors (nonstate actors). Thus, we understand that an aggressor may not necessarily be a traditional nation-state that has forcefully moved into the national territory of another. The enemy may now become a nonstate actor and/or a surrogate or proxy who plans and implements the kind of direct or indirect, lethal or nonlethal, or military or nonmilitary activity that exploits instabilities within their own country or between their and other countries. Many of the “Wars of National Liberation” and “People’s Wars” that were fought all over the world during the Cold War are good examples of this phenomenon. Today, in this context, the international community should consider the implications for national stability, security, and sovereignty, given the high probability of state and nonstate entities (including transnational criminal organizations [TCOs]) providing money, arms, technology, training, sanctuaries, and other assets to radical populist movements and to insurgent, terrorist, or criminal groups throughout Central and South America and the Caribbean. At the same time, we should consider the implications of all kinds of weaponry becoming more and more available and less and less expensive to anyone with a will to use violence against a given political target.²⁸

Purpose and Motive Have Changed.

The circular logic that links stability to development and to sovereignty and societal peace takes us back to where we began—to purpose and motive. Combatant

enemies are no longer opponents who pose absolute and clear threats to the national territory or society in recognizable military formations. One can no longer take, hold, or destroy a geographical objective and/or an enemy military formation. Enemies now conceal themselves among the population in small groups and maintain no fixed address. Thus, the nontraditional contemporary purpose of becoming involved in a conflict is to establish conditions for achieving a political objective. Irregular enemies now also seek to establish conditions that drain and exhaust their stronger opponents. In seeking to establish these conditions, opponents' political objectives center on influencing public opinion and political leadership. Ultimately, the primary motive is to impose one's will on the other.²⁹

Yet, in this new global security environment, secondary and tertiary motives for conflict have changed dramatically from the traditional goals of (1) gaining or denying access to populations, markets, resources, territories, choke points, or lines of communication, or (2) compelling adherence to an ideology. Newly recognized motives would include attaining commercial advantage and gaining wealth.³⁰ To be sure, however, ideological motives for pursuing conflict have not gone away, in spite of the long-standing commercialization of conflict. As one example, al-Qai'da's Osama bin Laden represents a militant, revolutionary, and energetic commitment to a long-term approach to a renewal of an extremist interpretation of Islamic governance, social purpose, and tradition.³¹

In the final analysis, the central idea in contemporary conflict is to influence and control people. Thus, the primary center of gravity (the hub of all power

and movement) is not military. It is public opinion and leadership.³² In these terms, public opinion and leadership provide the basic architecture from which to develop a viable ends, ways, and means strategy. The intent of such a strategy is to capture the will of the people and their leaders and, by that means, win the trial of moral strength.³³

Means Have Changed.

The ways and means of achieving one's purposes/motives have changed from primarily military means to a combination of all available methods of conducting conflict. Generally, that suggests (1) military and nonmilitary, (2) lethal and nonlethal, and (3) direct and indirect ways and means. As only a few examples, combinations of military, trans-military, and nonmilitary operations would include the following:

- Conventional war/Network war/Sanctions war;
- Guerrilla war/Drug war/Media war;
- Bio-chemical war/Intelligence war/Resources war;
- Terrorist war/Financial war/Ideological war; and,
- Limited Atomic war/Diplomatic war/Trade war.³⁴

The idea of utilizing combinations of operations broadens the idea of a nation-state—or a hegemonic nonstate actor—employing all available instruments of national and international power to protect, maintain, or achieve its vital interests. Regardless of what form a given conflict may take—from indirect financial war, to indirect media war, to direct military war—war

is war, or conflict is conflict. Any of the above types of operations can be combined with others to form completely new ways and means to conduct conflict. There is no instrument of power that cannot be “mixed and matched” with others. The only limitation would be one’s imagination. Self-interest would be the only constant. That is why Qiao and Wang call this type of conflict “Unrestricted War.”³⁵ And, it must be remembered that war (conflict) is still the means to compel an enemy to accept one’s will.

Battlefields Have Changed.

As the purposes, parties, and means that pertain to contemporary conflict have changed, so have the battlefields changed and expanded. Metz and Millen argue that four distinct yet highly interrelated battle spaces exist in the contemporary security arena: (1) traditional, direct interstate war; (2) unconventional nonstate war, which tends to involve gangs, insurgents, drug traffickers, other transnational criminal organizations, and warlords who thrive in “ungoverned space” between and within various host countries; (3) unconventional intrastate war, which tends to involve direct vs. indirect conflict between state and nonstate actors; and (4) indirect interstate war, which entails aggression by a nation-state against another, through proxies.³⁶

Regardless of the analytical separation of the different battlefields, all state and nonstate actors involved are engaged in one common political act – political war, to control and/or radically change a government – to institutionalize the acceptance of one’s will.³⁷ Additional strategic level analytical commonalities in the modern battlefields include (1) no formal declarations

or terminations of conflict, (2) no easily identified human foe to attack and defeat, (3) no specific territory to attack and hold, (4) no single credible government or political actor with which to deal, and (5) no guarantee that any agreement between or among contending actors will be honored.³⁸ In this fragmented, complex, and ambiguous political-psychological environment, conflict must be considered and implemented as a whole. The power to deal with these kinds of situations is no longer combat firepower or more benign police power. Rather, it is the multilevel, combined political, psychological, moral, informational, economic, social, police, and military activity that can be brought to bear holistically on the causes and consequences—as well as the perpetrators—of violence.³⁹ In turn, that kind of response will generate security and protect the individual and collective well-being, which can lead to durable societal peace.⁴⁰

Conclusions.

The military transformation necessary to begin to achieve this kind of holistic approach to the use of power is not only a modernization of technology and firepower; it also requires changes in doctrine and force structure, and the development of new forms of indirect confrontation (combat). Clearly, in rethinking threat and response in contemporary irregular conflict, vastly more important than manpower, weaponry, and technology are the following leadership capabilities: lucid and incisive thinking, resourcefulness, determination, imagination, and a certain disregard for convention. In this context, it must be remembered that, more than anything, this kind of holistic conflict is based on perceptions, beliefs, expectations, legitimacy,

and the political will to challenge an opponent. In short, this kind of conflict is based primarily on words, images, and ideas. It will not be won simply by seizing specific territory militarily or destroying specific buildings, cities, or industrial capabilities. This kind of conflict is won by altering, indirectly and directly, the political-psychological factors that are most relevant in a targeted culture in one's own favor.⁴¹

This is the contextual beginning point for understanding where Hugo Chavez intends to go and how he expects to get there. Whether he eventually achieves his aims or not is irrelevant. This is the starting point from which to understand the first, second, and third order effects that will shape the security environment in which Latin America and much of the rest of the world must struggle and survive over the next several years. This is also the point from which to develop the strategic vision to counter radical populism, *caudillismo*, and the purposeful oppositionist (revolutionary) instability, violence, and chaos they engender. It is also the starting point from which to develop strategies and principles of action that either will support or attempt to counter an unconventional 4GW Super Insurgency policy; in other words, two sides of the same proverbial coin—insurgency and counterinsurgency.

IMPLICATIONS: LATIN AMERICAN SECURITY AND SOVEREIGNTY UNDER SIEGE

President Chavez is encouraging his Venezuelan and other Latin American followers to pursue a confrontational, “defensive,” populist, and nationalistic agenda that will supposedly liberate Latin America from economic dependency and the

political imperialism of the North American (United States) "Colossus."⁴² Chavez argues that liberation, New Socialism, and Bolivarianismo (the dream of a Latin American Liberation Movement against U.S. hegemony) will only be achieved by (1) radically changing the traditional politics of the Venezuelan state to that of "direct" (totalitarian) democracy;⁴³ (2) destroying North American hegemony throughout all of Latin America; (3) conducting a Super Insurgency or War of All the People (People's War) to depose the illegitimate external enemy (North America); and (4) building a new Bolivarian state, beginning with Venezuela and extending eventually to the whole of Latin America.⁴⁴ The creation, protection, and the expansion of that Bolivarian dream depends on three enabling concepts: first, a radical restructuring of the Venezuelan state; second, a 4GW "Super Insurgency"; and, third, a broad Program for the Liberation of Latin America from North American hegemony.

The Radical Restructuring of the Venezuelan State.

The political, economic, social, informational, and security bases for the achievement of President Chavez's Bolivarian state are ambitious, vast, and amorphous. They include, however, four general political-economic, social, informational, and military/security concepts or programs.

Political-Economic Concepts. The system of power upon which internal and external Bolivarian objectives will be achieved is based on the concept of direct democracy. The main tenets dictate that: (1) the new authority in the state must be a leader who communicates directly with the people, interprets their need, and emphasizes "social expenditure" to

guarantee the legitimate needs and desires of the people; (2) elections, Congress, and the courts will provide formal democracy and international legitimacy, but will have no real role in governance or in controlling the economy; (3) the state will own and control all the major means of national production and distribution; and (4) the national and regional political-economic integration function will be performed by the leader (Hugo Chavez) by means of his financial, material, and political-military support of "people's movements."⁴⁵

Social Programs. To strengthen his personal position and internal power base, President Chavez is spending large amounts of money on an amorphous Plan Bolivar 2000 that builds and renovates schools, clinics, day nurseries, roads, and housing for the poor. Additionally, the President is developing education and literacy outreach programs, agrarian reform programs, and workers' cooperatives. At the same time, he has established MERCAL, a state company that provides subsidized foodstuffs to the poor. Chavez has also imported 16,000 Cuban doctors to help take care of the medical needs of the Venezuelan underclasses. Clearly, these programs offer tangible benefits to the mass of Venezuelans who were generally neglected by previous governments.⁴⁶

Communications and Information. The intent, in this effort, is to generate mass consensus. *Bolivarianismo* will require maximum media (radio, TV, and newspapers/magazines) support to purvey ideas, develop public opinion, and generate electoral successes. Ample evidence exists that Chavez-controlled media are using emotional arguments to gain attention, to exploit real and imagined fears of the population and create outside enemies as scapegoats for internal failures, and to inculcate the notion that opposition to the regime

equates to betrayal of the country. President Chavez's personal involvement in the communications effort is also clear and strong. Reportedly, statements, speeches, and interviews of Chavez are being broadcast throughout Venezuela, the Caribbean Basin, and large parts of Central and South America every day on the state-owned and controlled *Television del Sur*.⁴⁷

The Military/Security Program. First, the Venezuelan Constitution of 1999 provides political and institutional autonomy for the armed forces, under the centralized control of the president and commander-in-chief. President Chavez has also created an independent national police force, outside the traditional control of the armed forces, which is responsible to the president. At the same time, efforts have gone forward to establish a 1.5 million-person military reserve and two additional paramilitary organizations—the *Frente Bolivariano de Liberacion* (Bolivarian Liberation Front) and the *Ejercito del Pueblo en Arms* (Army of the People in Arms). The armed forces and the police perform traditional national defense and internal security missions, within the context of preparing for what President Chavez calls 4GW war of all the people. The military reserve and the paramilitary are charged to (1) protect the country from a U.S. and/or Colombian invasion, or resist such an invasion with an Iraqi-style insurgency; and (2) act as armed, anti-opposition forces. The institutional separation of the various security organizations ensures that no one institution can control the others, but the centralization of those institutions under the President ensures his absolute control of security and “social harmony” in Venezuela.⁴⁸

Reportedly, Venezuelan security forces are being trained for their mandated roles and are conducting maneuvers that demonstrate their proficiency at

repelling an external invasion force, and show their capability to conduct irregular war. In that connection, specifically, the Chinese are training Venezuelan commandos, and the regular Venezuelan military is training unconventional forces in counterinvasion resistance tactics.⁴⁹ Lastly, light arms, ammunition, air and naval transport, and other equipment appropriate for 4GW and “armed propaganda” are being purchased from Russia, Spain, and other countries at a reported cost of over \$3 billion.⁵⁰

Conclusions. All these programs together provide the President of Venezuela with the unified political-economic-social-informational-military instruments of power of the nation-state. In turn, that can allow him the singular pursuit of his political-strategic objectives. At a minimum, then, Venezuela may be becoming capable of helping to destabilize large parts of Latin America. The political purpose of any given destabilization effort would be to prepare the way to force a radical restructuring of a target country’s government and economy—and bring it under Venezuelan political-economic influence.

Hugo Chavez understands that war is no longer limited to using military violence to bring about desired political-economic-social change. Rather, all means that can be brought to bear on a given situation must be used to compel a targeted government to do one’s will. He will tailor his campaign to his adversaries’ political-economic-cultural-military vulnerabilities, and to their psychological precepts. This is the basis of Chavez’s instruction to the Venezuelan armed forces, and their invited foreign guests, at the “1st Military Forum on Fourth Generation War and Asymmetric War” in 2004. The charge to the forum was to develop a doctrinal paradigm change from conventional military to

people's war. He said: "I call upon everybody to start an . . . effort to apprehend . . . the ideas, concepts, and doctrine of asymmetric war."⁵¹

Irregular 4GW and Super Insurgency.

Since 1648 and the Treaty of Westphalia, a more realistic definition of aggression and war has been developed that allows a way out of the intellectual vice lock imposed by Westphalian legalism. This new, broader concept of conflict takes us toward a "full spectrum" of closely related, direct and indirect, lethal and nonlethal, military and nonmilitary, national, subnational, and individual sovereignty and security concerns (threats). In the broadest possible terms, whoever impinges on state control of national territory and the people in it is a threat to that country's national sovereignty and security. Whatever the specific threat, its logical conclusion can lead either to violent radical political change or the failure of a traditional nation-state.⁵²

Former Lieutenant Colonel Chavez knows this. Lacking the conventional power to challenge the United States or virtually any one of his immediate neighbors, Chavez understands that irregular asymmetric warfare is the logical means for his Bolivarian expression and self-assertion. As a result, in May 2005, he provided all Venezuelan military officers (and others who wanted it) with a new book written by a Spanish Marxist-oriented "New Socialist," Jorge Verstryngue Rojas. Entitled, *La Guerra Periférica y el Islam Revolucionario: Orígenes, reglas, y ética de la Guerra asimétrica* (Peripheral [Indirect] War and Revolutionary Islam: Origins, Regulations, and Ethics of Asymmetric War),⁵³ this book provides a theoretical and doctrinal basis for the

conduct of indirect, irregular, political-psychological war in the 21st century. Nothing in the book is really new, but it is a well-conceived and well-written piece of work by an experienced practitioner and oppositionist. It reminds the reader of the indirect applications of *Unrestricted Warfare*, written by Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, two Chinese colonels, in 1999.⁵⁴

The main themes that run through these books stress the use of all available networks—direct and indirect political, economic, social, informational, and military—to dominate the nontraditional human terrain (vs. the conventional geographical terrain). By using the full spectrum of the multidimensional components of indirect and unrestricted—total—war, a protagonist can produce what Qiao and Wang call a “Cocktail Mixture” of unconventional ways and means of confronting a stronger opponent. This kind of irregular war—based on the notion that the human terrain is the main contemporary center of gravity—is based primarily on words, images, and ideas. Nevertheless, it must be remembered that the idea of unrestricted war does not preclude direct military operations. In any event, the only ethics are those that contribute directly to the achievement of the ultimate political objective of forcing a stronger opponent to acquiesce to his weaker adversary’s will. The only rule is that there are no rules.⁵⁵ However, before elaborating on the strategic aspects of 4GW Super Insurgency, it is helpful to look briefly at its antecedents.

First- Through Third-Generation Conflict. First-generation war is characterized by the low-tech attrition war that has been the principal means of conducting conflict from the beginning of time. The basic idea is that the more opponents killed or incapacitated relative to one’s own side, the better. Historically, attrition

war appears to serve only those protagonists with the largest numbers of human resources. When facing a numerically superior opponent, it has been important to find other means to compensate for numerical inferiority.⁵⁶

As a result, second-generation warfare was intended to provide the numerically inferior combatant with the means to outperform more numerous opponents. The basic concept is to employ surprise, speed, and lethality to bring pressure to bear on an enemy's weak spots. In essence, the military force that can "move, shoot, and communicate" more effectively relative to the opponent has the advantage and is more likely to prevail.⁵⁷ The German blitzkrieg of World War II and the American "shock and awe" approach in the Persian Gulf and Iraqi wars are examples of these methods and exemplify second-generation warfare.

Third-generation conflict moves from the blatant use of physical force toward the employment of brainpower to achieve success against an enemy. This entails a transition from hard power to a combination of hard and soft power. In addition to using first- and second-generation methods, third-generation conflict methodology tends to take advantage of intelligence, psychological operations, other knowledge-based means, technologies, and cultural programming (manipulation) as force multipliers. The basic intent of soft power is to provide more effective and efficient means than hard power through which to paralyze enemy action.⁵⁸ It should be noted, however, that while the use of soft brain power is less bloody than the use of hard-power assets, such as infantry, artillery, armor, and aircraft, the ultimate objective of war remains the same—that is, to force the enemy to accede to one's own interests.

The Strategic Characteristics of 4GW Super Insurgency.

Rather than thinking of each generation of conflict as an independent form of warfare, it is more useful to think of them as parts within the concept of unrestricted and peripheral (indirect) war.⁵⁹ In essence, 4GW is a long-standing methodology of the weak against the strong. The primary characteristic is that of asymmetry (the use of disparity between contending opponents to gain relative advantage). Chavez knows this. Moreover, he understands that contemporary nontraditional (peripheral) war is not a kind of lesser or limited appendage to the more comfortable attrition and maneuver warfare paradigms. It is a great deal more.⁶⁰

First, the “battlefield” is everywhere. Second, 21st century conflict is intended to resist, oppose, gain control of, and/or overthrow an existing government or symbol of power.⁶¹ Third, Chavez also understands that battles are won at the tactical and operational levels, but wars are won at the strategic level.⁶² In that context, the most salient strategic-level characteristics of 4GW include the notions that (1) the struggle is predominantly political-psychological; (2) the conflict is normally lengthy and evolves through three, four, or more stages; (3) 4GW is fought between belligerents with asymmetrical capabilities and varying levels of responsibility to their constituencies; (4) 4GW is very likely to have transnational dimensions and implications; and (5) in the final analysis, the struggle is total, in that it gives the winner absolute power to control or replace an existing order.⁶³ As a consequence, there is one more set of lessons that must be taken into account when dealing with insurgency and counterinsurgency.

4GW Super Insurgency is primarily political-psychological. Experience and the data show that the moral right of an incumbent regime or challenger re-

gime to govern is the most important single dimension in contemporary conflict. The principal tool in achieving and maintaining the right to govern is legitimacy. Legitimacy of cause and behavioral rectitude, on one hand, and the illegitimacy of the opponent, on the other, are key. In virtually any given conflict situation, the opposition is offering a redress of real or perceived grievances and a better way of life.⁶⁴ On the behavioral side of the Latin American situation, President Chavez is putting forward the idea of liberation from the politically and economically dominating and exploitive "Colossus of the North." Under these terms, he is persuading and co-opting people rather than coercing them. The primary instruments of power now include dialogues on ideology, debates on Latin vs. North American cultural values, the attempt to influence through the example of compassion, and the Bolivarian appeal to the potential of Latin American *grandeza* (greatness). Military instruments of power are used to achieve political and psychological objectives, rather than purely military objectives.⁶⁵

4GW is lengthy. Because insurgency-rooted conflict is generally political-psychological, the protagonists must understand that it takes time to change people's minds and prepare them for phased, progressive moves toward short- and mid-term as well as long-term objectives. Clearly, the better one protagonist is at that persuasive effort, the more effective he will be relative to the opposition.⁶⁶ Again, this takes time. As examples, Mao and his Chinese communists fought for 28 years (1921-49); the Vietnamese communists fought for 30 years (1945-75); the Nicaraguan Sandinista insurgents fought for 18 years (1961-79); and the Peruvian Sendero Luminoso insurgents claim that they are prepared to fight for 75 years (1962-?) to achieve their revolutionary

goals.⁶⁷ A Dutch colonel in Afghanistan describes the lengthiness of contemporary conflict in terms that are less precise yet quite accurate and realistic. He argues, “We are not here to fight the Taliban. We’re here to make the Taliban irrelevant.”⁶⁸ President Chavez knows that the key function of an irregular 4GW protagonist is to sustain his ideas and organization—and outlast the opponent. As a consequence, anything except defeat in detail is victory.⁶⁹

4GW is fought among belligerents with varying levels of responsibility to their constituents. This aspect of Super Insurgency equates not only to the issue of responsibility, but also to organizational effectiveness. Challenger protagonists in this type of war generally hold the decisionmaking power in their own self-appointed hands. These leaders do not normally have to consult with constituents before making decisions and do not have to explain their actions after the fact. No formal officials have to be elected, no national laws or boundaries must be respected, and no responsibility is owed to anyone outside the organization. Thus, the principal tool in this situation is organization to generate as complete a unity of effort as possible. Thus, nonstate organization for unity of effort is flatter, smaller, and more effective than most governmental and traditional military bureaucracies. Decisions can be made and implemented faster than those of traditional governmental opposition, and the asymmetric protagonist can be generally proactive while forcing the foe to be merely reactive.⁷⁰ President Chavez’s centralization of the Venezuelan government and creation of what is essentially a one-party state—himself at the head of it all—demonstrates a clear sense of the utility and continuity of organizational unity of effort. That centralizing reorganization of the

Venezuelan government also clarifies the purpose of Chavez's moves to change the Constitution to allow his continuation in office.⁷¹

Transnational dimensions and implications of irregular war. At least three transnational aspects are associated with contemporary 4GW conflict. First, experience and the data show that insurgencies require resources that they cannot produce for themselves—money, equipment, training, and political-psychological support at regional and international (supra-national) levels. As a result, these implementing resources and support must be provided by other actors—state or nonstate. Second, most, if not all, successful insurgency-rooted movements have had access to sanctuaries across international borders to recuperate, reequip, retrain, and maintain their offensive capabilities. Third, in that connection, insurgents constantly cross borders to evade pursuit and to expand their freedom of action and movement.⁷²

The principal tools, in this situation, include foreign alliances, public diplomacy at home and abroad, intelligence, information and propaganda operations, and cultural manipulation measures to influence and/or control public opinion and decisionmaking in a targeted country and abroad. Accordingly, several cases—from the Algerian War (1954-62); the Salvadoran Insurgency War (1980-89); the (Russian) Afghan War (1979-89); to the past and present situations in the former Yugoslavia—provide examples of this phenomenon.⁷³ Again, Hugo Chavez understands these things. This wise competitor knows exactly what General Vo Nguyen Giap meant when he said, “If the people’s war of liberation [in Vietnam] ended in a glorious victory, it is because we did not fight alone. That victory cannot be isolated from the sympathy and support of progressive

peoples throughout the world.”⁷⁴ This reality takes us back to where we began, to the centrality of behavioral rectitude and moral legitimacy.

Asymmetric 4GW is Total War. At base, people want things that may be divided into “freedom from” and “freedom to.” They want freedom from fear, intimidation, hunger, poverty, and uncertainty. They want freedom to prosper and do what they reasonably want to do. And, they want a society and political structure they can understand and relate to. They will attribute moral legitimacy to and follow the political or military leader who – in the circumstances – is considered to be the most likely to provide these things.⁷⁵ By transforming the emphasis of war from military violence to the level of a struggle for moral legitimacy, the insurgents can strive for total objectives – the control or overthrow of a government. The use of indirect moral and other nonlethal force permits a protagonist to engage in a secret and prolonged war, while purporting to pursue altruistic purposes. Accordingly, war is not an extension of politics. War is politics. Because it is a zero-sum game, there can only be one winner. It is, as noted above, total war.⁷⁶

Conclusions. Clearly, the United States, Canada, Europe, Latin America, and those other parts of the global community most integrated into the interdependent world economy are embroiled in a security arena in which time-honored concepts of national security and the classical military means to attain it, while still necessary, are no longer sufficient. In addition to traditional regional security issues, an array of nontraditional threats challenges the global community. Wise nontraditional competitors will always seek to shift the playing field away from conventional military confrontations and tend to

employ terrorist tactics and strategies and other unconventional forms of assault on “enemy” nations and “undesirable” global institutions. Again, these include state and nonstate, military and nonmilitary, lethal and nonlethal, direct and indirect, and a mixture of some or all of the above kinds of threats.

The Chavez Program for the Liberation of Latin America.

Hugo Chavez consistently identifies the origins of the Bolivarian Revolution and defines the central strategic problem in Latin America as the lack of legitimacy of the U.S.-dominated governments in the region. He further identifies the primary objective of the revolution as power. Power is generated by an intelligent, motivated, and disciplined leader and his organization for achievement of direct democracy, with a vision of Latin American greatness. In that connection, and as noted at the outset, President Chavez is pursuing a Super Insurgency with a confrontational, defensive, populist, and nationalistic agenda that is intended eventually to liberate Latin America from U.S. economic dependency and political domination. That is a Herculean task, but he appears to be prepared to take his time, let his enemies become accustomed to a given purposeful action, and then slowly move toward new stages of the revolution in a deliberate, slow, and phased manner. Thus, by staying under his opponents’ “threshold of concern,” Chavez says that he expects to “put his enemies to sleep—to later wake up dead.”⁷⁷

This is not the rhetoric of a “nut case.” It is, importantly, the rhetoric of an individual who is performing the traditional and universal Leninist-

Maoist function of providing a strategic vision and the operational plan for gaining revolutionary power. Chavez is planning for a protracted struggle, using a long-term, three-stage, multiphase program for gaining power. His notional three stages use different terminology but are similar to those of Lenin and Mao: (1) Establishment of an Organization, (2) Development of Political and Limited Military Power, and (3) Capture of a Targeted Government.

Stage 1: Establishment of an Organization (Lenin: Development of a Cadre; Mao: Strategic Defensive). This is the essential first effort. It requires taking the time necessary to lay the strongest possible organizational foundations for the subsequent political-psychological-military struggle. In this stage, the revolutionary leadership must concentrate on doctrine and leadership development, expansion of the organization's relationship with other political movements, and, generally, the creation of a receptive political-psychological environment for the revolutionary movement.

More specifically, one of Chavez's mentors, Abraham Guillen, teaches that the Bolivarian leadership must (1) propagate Latin American nationalism; (2) educate and prepare several hundred professionals for combat, organizational duties, and governance who are prepared to lead the masses through a Revolution and into the proverbial halls of power; and (3) create a popular front not just of "a few true believers but for a combination of Christians, Socialists, trade unionists, intellectuals, students, peasants, and the debourgeoisied middle class who will march together to defeat sepyoan (regional) militarism and U.S. imperialism."⁷⁸

Guillen, a strong advocate of contemporary urban insurgency, argues that from these beginnings, the revolutionary Bolivarian leadership must expand

organizational and training efforts from the urban centers into the countryside and begin to mobilize the energy of all the people of Latin America. But, in that connection, he says that it is better to wait for economic and social crises to discredit incumbent Latin American regimes than to fight them militarily, in that defeating sepoyan security forces will not resolve all problems. Moreover, in that connection, Guillen believes that revolutionary politics must not be sectarian, dogmatic, or intolerant, but, rather, flexible – freed from semantic “isms” and operating in the name of the general interest: “[Revolutionary leadership] must formulate its own program . . . which stresses whatever unites rather than divides [the people].” The intent, according to Guillen, is to win the support of and awaken the admiration of the vast majority of the targeted population (human terrain).⁷⁹

Stage 2: Development of Political and Military Power (Lenin: Create Political Infrastructure and Form and Deploy a Military Arm; Mao: Strategic Stalemate). As with the organizational stage, the second stage of the revolution is preparatory and long term. And, again, the leadership must take the time necessary to develop and nurture popular support while increasing the size of the organization, while establishing and defending liberated zones. This kind of effort allows the consolidation and expansion of political and logistical support bases, the extension of influence throughout the various Latin American countries, and the establishment of de facto control in areas uncontrolled or abandoned by the state.

More specifically, the political effort requires the formation and nurturing of a number of ancillary multinational organizations. The most important would include (1) a united Anti-Imperialist Political

Party (Front), (2) a united central Trade Union Organization, (3) a united Latin American Youth Federation, (4) a united Labor Party, and (5) a united Army of Unity and Liberation. The general purposes of these organizations would be to continue to raise the level of direct popular action against “indigenous feudalism, aboriginal capitalism, sepoyan militarism, and *yanqui* imperialism.” These organizations would also provide leadership experience and human skills that will be necessary when it is time to form a direct government of people and install a socialist mode of production and distribution.⁸⁰

As might be expected, Guillen and other contemporary revolutionary theorists, argue that the military effort is more political and psychological than military. Revolutionary war does not propose to decide anything by means of battles or by occupying foreign soil. Nevertheless, an Army of National Liberation must eventually be formed in each Latin American country, with a central Latin American strategic command. The Army would be further organized into (1) local militias that fight only in their own zones, (2) provincial or district militias that would fight in their own zones, and (3) an army that fights in all parts of the country with the cooperation of local and provincial militias.⁸¹

Operations to further a Bolivarian Super Insurgency would consist of scattered surprise attacks at the enemy’s weakest points by quick and mobile units superior in arms and numbers. The army and the militias must cede territory and human terrain if necessary but must continually harass the enemy until his morale is broken. The popular army also coordinates mass actions (demonstrations), strikes, mutinies, occupation of factories, and seizures of schools and universities. Additionally, the army

coordinates sabotage, kidnapping, robberies, terrorist acts, and armed propaganda throughout the country. Then, in the latter phases of Stage 2, the military arm of the revolutionary movement can entice an enemy into territory where the population is supportive and where the enemy may be exhausted, demoralized, and ultimately defeated in a prolonged struggle. Finally, in Maoist terms, a National Liberation Army must prepare for Stage 3 of the Revolution by organizing, training, and equipping itself to confront directly but gradually a demoralized conventional enemy force and bring about the final military collapse of its adversary. Again, the intent is not to destroy the enemy but to wear him down over time to the point where his resolve is dead. As a result, "political and moral factors are more decisive for victory than heavy armament and ironclad units."⁸²

Stage 3: Capture of a Targeted Government. (This is basically the same terminology as that of Lenin and similar to Mao's "Strategic Offensive.") This stage of the liberation process (revolution) is reached only when the enemy is completely demoralized, and it requires the efforts of a relatively small military force to finalize the total collapse of the state. This collapse will not be the result of any one spectacular action, but the result of several small, deadly, and successive actions. Theoretically, the collapse will not be allowed to take place until (1) interior and urban support bases are consolidated, (2) the Bolivarian leadership cadre is sufficiently prepared and large enough to administer and govern the state effectively, and (3) the revolutionary organization is prepared to (a) hold its ground against a concerted "imperialist" counter-attack from outside the country, and (b) move against the next targeted state in a subsequent subphase of the general Latin American

Liberation effort.⁸³

Conclusions.

At present, Chavez is only in the beginning phases of his first Organizational Stage of the long-term program for the Liberation of Latin America. The culmination of Stage 1 is still a long time away. Stages 2 and 3 must be several years down the revolutionary path. At the strategic level, then, President Chavez appears to be consolidating his base position in Venezuela through the establishment of personal political control through the totalitarian mechanisms of “direct democracy,” taking a relatively low revolutionary profile, and waiting for a propitious time to begin the expansion of the revolution on a Supra-National Latin American scale. He will likely continue to focus his primary attack on the legitimacy of the U.S. economic and political domination of the Americas, as well as any other possible rival. And, he will likely continue to conduct various rhetorical attacks on adversaries; cultivate diverse allies in Latin America, the Middle East, and Asia; and continue to engage in organizational “seeding operations” for the creation of a receptive political climate throughout Latin America.⁸⁴ Until the last moment in Stage 3—when the targeted government is in the process of collapsing—every action is preparatory work and not expected to provoke much immediate concern from the enemy.⁸⁵

The seriousness of this final stage and the preliminary organizational stages of Chavez’s 4GW program to liberate Latin America cannot be dismissed as too difficult, too ambiguous, or too far into the future to deal with. In 2005, we emphasized this adaptation of 4GW and summarized its consequences by taking

a page from a Harry Potter adventure. We called it “Wizard’s Chess.” We further characterized Chavez as a “Master” of this deadly game, as a metaphorical example of contemporary asymmetric conflict. The analogy is still instructive and sobering:

In that game, protagonists move pieces silently and subtly all over the game board. Under the players’ studied direction, each piece represents a different type of direct and indirect power and might simultaneously conduct its lethal and non-lethal attacks from differing directions. Each piece shows no mercy against its foe and is prepared to sacrifice itself in order to allow another piece the opportunity to destroy or control an opponent—or to checkmate the king. Over the long-term, however, this game is not a test of expertise in creating instability, conducting illegal violence, or achieving some sort of moral satisfaction. Ultimately, it is an exercise in survival. Failure in Wizard’s Chess is not an option.⁸⁶

This cautionary tale reminds us that irregular asymmetric 4GW is the only type of conflict that a modern power has ever lost.⁸⁷ It is surprising and dismaying that the world’s only superpower does not have a unified strategy and a multidimensional, interagency organizational structure to deal with 4GW Super Insurgency.

RETHINKING THREAT AND RESPONSE: MOVING FROM A MILITARY TO A POPULACE- ORIENTED CONFLICT MODEL


In rethinking threat and response in the new global security environment, one must realize that the United States, Europe, and those other parts of the global community most integrated into the interdependent world economy are embroiled in a complex security

arena that—while possibly less bloody in soft power terms—is ultimately no less brutal. Given this reality, failure to prepare adequately for present and future irregular contingencies is unconscionable. The first organizational step in developing an appropriate response to contemporary conflict is to become aware of global disequilibrium and popular sovereignty and to begin to deal with the relationship of instability to legitimate governance. The cognitive second step is to realize, whether one likes it or not or whether one is prepared for it or is not, that a populace-oriented model describes accurately the contemporary security arena.⁸⁸ Taking these steps would set the foundation for a better understanding of and a more effective response to contemporary irregular, people-oriented, asymmetric conflict.

A Populace-Oriented (Personal Security) Model.

A populace-oriented extension of the SWORD Model for taking responsibility for unconventional intranational, nonstate, and indirect interstate conflicts, going beyond “declaring victory and coming home,” depicts the activities and efforts of the various players involved (see Figure 1).⁸⁹ This model portrays the allegiance of a population as the primary center of gravity. Persuasive, co-optive, and coercive measures will determine success or failure in the achievement of a just civil society and a durable peace. Thus, both the government and its external allies and the internal illegal opposition and its external allies can coerce, co-opt, and persuade the populace into actions on behalf of either side. Then, in addition, the people can coerce and persuade the government or opposition to change the conditions in society to meet their demands and to

undertake the types of behavior and actions that the citizenry perceives to be legitimate.



(1) Overall goal: gain popular support.

- (1) Overall goal: gain popular support.
- (2) Development and other activities designed to gain popular support.
- (3) Indirect activities designed to isolate government and opposition forces from the populace.
- (4) Direct attacks by the government and opposition on each other, intended to discourage popular support for the other.

**Figure 1. Populace-Oriented Model
of the Movement of Popular Support between an
Incumbent Government and an Illegal Internal Foe.**

The application of this model for contemporary irregular populace-oriented conflict requires, at a minimum, some additional conceptual and organi-

zational efforts: (1) a new concept of the center of gravity; (2) a new concept of deterrence; (3) an unconventional strategic objective, along with a redefinition of enemy, power, and victory; and (4) end-state planning and an integrated strategic implementing process.

A New Concept of Center of Gravity. The idea of rethinking the notion of center of gravity intrudes on the comfortable, conventional vision of war in which an obvious enemy military formation poses a clear threat to national boundaries, resources, and other interests. As mentioned earlier, Clausewitz reminds us that in places subject to internal strife (intranational, indirect international, and nonstate conflicts), the hub of all power and strength (center of gravity) is the people.⁹⁰ Thus, in contemporary unconventional conflict, the primary center of gravity changes from a familiar military concept to an ambiguous, unconventional, and uncomfortable populace-oriented paradigm.

This analysis helps to explain, for example, what happened in Vietnam. Americans thought they were fighting a limited war of attrition against a traditional military enemy—whose uniform was funny-looking black pajamas. However, the threat the South Vietnamese government and the United States had to deal with was not limited, conventional, or comical. Rather, the Vietcong enemy was making unconventional, coercive, populace-oriented, political-psychological preparations to take complete control of the state.⁹¹ That nontraditional enemy focused its primary political-psychological attack on the legitimacy of the corrupt, U.S.-dominated South Vietnamese government. The main military effort was conducted in support of that objective in the form of “armed propaganda.” That terrorist strategy was not conducted to win the war but to convince the people

of Vietnam, other parts of the world, and even the United States that the South Vietnamese government and its foreign ally could not and would not provide the security and other legitimizing functions that responsible government is supposed to provide its people.⁹²

A major implication here is that it is necessary to determine correctly and attack aggressively the primary sources of an enemy political actor's physical, psychological, and moral strength. In that connection, centers of gravity must be attacked—and defended. This reflects the two sides of the proverbial insurgency-counterinsurgency struggle. Thus, it is as important for an attacker to take the necessary measures to defend his own centers of gravity as it is for him to deal with those of his opponents. In this context, U.S. leadership failed to defend American public opinion against the full-scale "media war" that was conducted by North Vietnam and its external allies throughout the world. American leadership failed to understand that the streets of Peoria and the halls of Congress were more decisive in determining the outcome of a war thousands of miles away than the military battlefields in Vietnam.⁹³

A New Concept of Deterrence. Deterrence is not necessarily military—although that is important. It is not necessarily negative or directly coercive, although that, too, is important. Deterrence is much broader than any of these elements. Deterrence can be direct and/or indirect, political-diplomatic, socioeconomic, psychological-moral, and/or militarily coercive. In its various forms and combinations of forms, it is an attempt to influence how and what an enemy or potential enemy thinks and does. That is, deterrence is the creation of a state of mind that either discourages

one thing or encourages something else. Motive and culture, thus, become crucial.⁹⁴ In this context, political-military communication and preventive diplomacy become a vital part of the deterrence equation.

As a result, the deterrence rule of thumb must move from U.S.-centric values and determine precisely what a hostile leadership values most, and identify exactly how that cultural value—whatever it is—can realistically be manipulated and held at risk. Conversely, a new deterrence rule of thumb must also consider what a hostile leadership values most and—as opposed to the proverbial stick—identify precisely what carrots might also be offered as deterrents. In these terms, we must think of ourselves not so much as warfighters as war preventers.⁹⁵

Thus, it is incumbent upon the United States and the rest of the global community to understand and cope with the threats imposed by contemporary, nontraditional actors, think outside the conventional box, and replace the old nuclear theology with a broad deterrence strategy, as it applies to the chaos provoked by the diverse state, nonstate, intrastate, and transnational nuclear and nonnuclear threats and menaces that have heretofore been ignored or wished away. The deterrence task, then, is straightforward. Culturally effective ways and means must be found to convince nontraditional players that it is not in their interests—whatever they may be—to continue to engage in negative behavior.⁹⁶

An Unconventional Strategic Objective and Redefinition of Power, Enemy, and Victory. Given that the enemy is no longer an easily identified military entity and given the essentially political-psychological-moral-coercive nature of the linkages among security, stability, development, legitimate governance, and sovereignty,

the contemporary security environment requires a new strategic objective. In the past, the strategic objective has been defined variously as “unconditional surrender,” “peace with honor,” “doing the right thing,” “drawing a line in the sand,” “showing we mean business,” “being credible,” and “rendering the enemy powerless.”⁹⁷ Also, in the past, U.S. leadership found that it was easier to deal with tactical- and operational-level nodes of vulnerability.⁹⁸ Yet, data and experience continually reinforce the political, strategic, holistic, and multidimensional aspects of contemporary conflict.⁹⁹

Power is no longer simply combat firepower directed at a uniformed soldier or an enemy’s military or industrial complex. Power is multilevel and combines political, psychological, moral, informational, economic, social, military, police, and civil-bureaucratic activities that can be brought to bear appropriately on the causes as well as the perpetrators of violence. And victory is no longer the obvious and acknowledged destruction of military capability, and the resultant unconditional surrender. Victory or success is now – more frequently, with perhaps with a bit of spin control – defined as the achievement of peace. What the world appears to be looking for and what the Populace-Oriented Model can lead to is a sustainable peace – with justice.¹⁰⁰

Analysis of the problems of generating a sustainable peace with justice takes us beyond providing some form of humanitarian assistance or refugee assistance in cases of human misery and need. Analysis of the problems of stability and peace takes us back to where we began. The core strategic problem is responsible political leadership in the post-Cold War world. Foreign policy and military asset management must

address this central issue.¹⁰¹ Additionally, the enormity and the logic of the establishment of a durable and just peace demand a carefully thought-out, phased, long-term planning and implementation process for sustainable peace with justice. British General Smith reminds us that contemporary combatants must seek to establish conditions that create a conceptual space for diplomacy, economic incentives, political pressure, and other measures to create a desired political [end-state].¹⁰² “[Otherwise], our military forces—and the force they apply—will lack utility.”¹⁰³

End-State Planning and an Integrated Strategic Implementing Process. The key to the implementation of a viable political stability strategy and strategic clarity is planning. This depends on a clear strategic vision, based upon the Populace-Oriented Model as a starting point. A viable strategy also depends on an organizational management structure and adequate resources to apply the vision on the basis of realistic calculations of ends, ways, means, and long-term timing. This takes us to end-state planning, unity of effort, and strategic clarity.

End-state planning starts from the truism that conflict is a continuation of politics by other means but with two qualifying arguments. First, military violence is required only when the conditions or changes sought cannot be achieved through political-diplomatic, socioeconomic, or informational-psychological ways and means.¹⁰⁴ Second, end-state planning advocates synchronization of all national and international civilian and military instruments of power so that the most synergism can be gained from the interaction of the variables selected for action.¹⁰⁵ The end-state planning argument concludes that if the United Nations or the United States or any other international player is

going to succeed in future conflicts, civil and military forces must be structured and employed in ways that respond to the dynamic political, economic, social, as well as military variables at work in the stability-peace paradigm. And, as logic and experience demand, the interagency community must base its decisions on a clear, mutually agreed definition of what ultimate success looks like—that is, share a vision of strategic clarity.¹⁰⁶

Attempts to achieve political and strategic objectives cannot be based on the ad hoc use of national and international instruments of power. Without organizations that can establish, enforce, and continually define a holistic plan and generate consistent national and international support, authority is fragmented and ineffective in resolving the myriad problems endemic to survival in contemporary conflict—and thus, operations can become increasingly incoherent. Requiring a high level of planning and coordination is not a matter of putting the cart before the horse. It is a matter of knowing where the horse is going and precisely how it is going to get there. Decisionmakers, policymakers, and planners should never lose sight of that bigger unity of effort picture.¹⁰⁷

Conclusions.

These cooperative and cognitive efforts will not be easy to implement. However, they should prove in the medium to long term to be far less demanding and costly in political, economic, military, and ethical terms than to continue an ad hoc, business-as-usual, reactive crisis management approach to hemispheric and global security.

WHAT MUST BE DONE – FIRST

The political-strategic paradigm outlined above acknowledges that the ultimate outcome of any contemporary conflict is not primarily determined by the skillful manipulation of violence in the many military battles that take place after a conflict is recognized to have begun. Rather, control of the situation is the product of connecting and weighting the various elements of national and international power within the context of strategic appraisals, strategic vision, strategic objectives, and strategic clarity. Thus, no number of ad-hoc, tactical, and operational level recommendations will be of any great help in dealing with contemporary irregular conflict until: (1) fundamental strategic changes in the U.S. interagency organizational architecture are implemented that will ensure effective institutional-national and trans-national unity of effort; and, (2) until strategic leaders understand and can deal with unconventional irregular conflict more comprehensively.

Organizational Mechanisms for Unity of Effort.

As the currently amorphous U.S. interagency community transitions to deal more effectively with the realities and requirements of the 21st century, it must respond to responsible recommendations that go beyond present Goldwater-Nichols legislation that mandated a more cohesive military unity of effort. In essence, the argument is that the entire civil-military interagency community must come together to provide the nation with the capability to better utilize all the instruments of hard and soft power in the contemporary global security arena.

Such unity of effort recommendations may be found, for example, in the Phase 1, 2, and 3 Reports of the Center for Strategic International Studies (CSIS). These comprehensive reports are entitled “Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era,” “Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: U.S. Government and Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era,” and “The Future of the National Guard and Reserves.”¹⁰⁸ Additionally, James R. Locher III and his associates at the Project on National Security Reform are making recommendations to reform the interagency community, similar to those passed by the U.S. Congress in the Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act.¹⁰⁹ The recommendations of these organizations focus on the bases from which the U.S. interagency community might develop a more effective organizational capability to work synergistically over the long term in complex, irregular, and politically ambiguous contemporary conflict situations. The primary intent of recommended new legislation would be to promulgate:

- An executive-level management structure that can and will ensure continuous cooperative planning and implementing of policy among and between the primary U.S. internal players. That structure must also be capable of continuous, cooperative planning and execution of policy among and between primary external actors (such as primary external allies, other coalition partners, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations). In these terms, structures must be developed whereby U.S. civil-military planning and implementing processes can be integrated with coalition/partner governments and armed forces,

nongovernmental agencies, and international organizations.

- That same structure must also ensure that all political-economic-informational-military actions at the operational and tactical levels directly contribute to the achievement of a mutually agreed, strategic, political end-state. This requirement implies a need to develop an effective end-state planning mechanism, allowing the interagency leadership to:
 - Think logically, in synchronized small phases, about the conditions they seek to create;
 - Synchronize the utilization of appropriate national and international hard and soft civil-military instruments of power for each phase of a given effort; and,
 - Ensure that every civil-military effort contributes directly to the achievement of the ultimate political objective (end-state).
- At a base level, however, unity of effort requires educational as well as organizational solutions. Even with an adequate planning and organizational structure, ambiguity, confusion, and tensions are likely to emerge. Unity of effort ultimately entails the type of professional civilian and military educational and leadership development that leads to effective diplomacy, enabling collegial and cooperative work.¹¹⁰

The Development of Civilian and Military Strategic Leaders.

Despite acknowledged political and organizational difficulties at the interagency level, it is imperative to develop leaders who can generate strategic clarity and make it work. Like other members of the interagency community who act as instruments of U.S. national power, the expanding roles and missions of the armed forces will require new doctrine, organization, equipment, and training to confront the challenges of irregular contemporary conflict. In this connection, the armed forces must also respond to responsible recommendations that go beyond present-day conventional warfare.

Such recommendations, as one example, that pertain directly to the U.S. Army may be found in “TF (Task Force) Irregular Challenges CSA (Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army) Outbrief,” and “TF Irregular Challenge DAS Decision Brief on Interagency Cadre Initiative,” presented by the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College in 2005 and 2006.¹¹¹ The recommendations in these documents center on the cultural mind set required to transition from the kinetic fight to nonkinetic conflict. The recommended strategic leader development process will encourage mental agility, enterprise management, governance, and cross-cultural savvy. This will help officers to operate more successfully with representatives of U.S. agencies/organizations other than their own, non-U.S. civilian and military agencies and organizations, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and local and global media.¹¹²

As a prerequisite to any possible legislation mandating a more unified whole-of-government effort

to deal with the challenges of irregular conflict, there are at least four doctrinal, educational, and cultural imperatives that the U.S. Army should consider and act upon:

- The study of the fundamental nature of conflict has always been the philosophical cornerstone for understanding conventional conflict. It is no less relevant to asymmetric irregular conflict. Thus, the Army should take the lead in promulgating 21st century concepts, definitions, and doctrine for key terms such as “enemy,” “war,” “victory,” and “power.”
- Moreover, nontraditional interests centering on national and international stability need to be reexamined and redefined. At the same time, the application of all the instruments of national and international power—including the full integration of legitimate civil and military coalition partners—to achieve political ends has to be rethought and redefined.
- As a corollary, the Army should also take the lead in revitalizing and expanding efforts that enhance interagency as well as international cultural awareness—such as civilian and military exchange programs, language training programs, culture orientation programs, and combined (multinational/multilateral) civilian and military exercises.
- Strategic leaders at all levels must understand the strategic and political-psychological implications of operational and tactical actions in contemporary conflict. In these terms, leaders must understand how force can be employed to achieve political ends, and the ways that

political considerations affect the use of force. Additionally, strategic leaders must understand the challenges of “ambiguity” so that they may be better prepared to deal with them.¹¹³

Additionally—but first—expanding U.S. Army roles, missions, force structure, doctrine, and developing new forms of indirect confrontation against irregular asymmetric 4GW forces will require: (1) new initiatives from the Executive Office of the Headquarters, U.S. Army, and G-3/5/7; (2) increased interagency engagement, in general; and, (3) in particular, robust Army involvement with the Department of State Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stability Operations (S/CRS).¹¹⁴

These recommendations are nothing radical. They are only the logical extensions of basic security strategy and national and international asset management. By accepting these realities and making the necessary cognitive and organizational adjustments, the United States can help to replace confrontation with cooperation and harvest the hope and fulfill the promise that a new multidimensional paradigm for dealing with asymmetric irregular conflict offers.

ENDNOTES

1. General Rupert Smith, *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World*, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2007, p. 3. (Italics in the text are mine.)

2. *Ibid.*, p. 5.

3. *Ibid.*, pp. 5-28. Also see Colonel Thomas X. Hammes, USMC, Ret., *The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century*, St. Paul, MN: Zenith Press, 2006, pp. 207-215; and General Nguyen Giap, *Peoples' War, Peoples' Army*, New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962, pp. 34-37.

4. President Chavez used this language in a charge to the National Armed Forces (FAN) to develop a doctrine for 4th Generation War. It was made before an audience gathered in the Military Academy auditorium for the "1st Military Forum on Fourth Generation War and Asymmetric War," in Caracas, Venezuela, and was reported in *El Universal*, April 8, 2005. Also, in January 2005, General Melvin Lopez Hidalgo, Secretary of the Venezuelan Defense Council, stated publicly that Venezuela was changing its security doctrine in order to better confront "la amenaza permanente de los Estados Unidos," (the permanent threat of the United States) and that a document entitled *Pueblo en Armas (The People in Arms)* had been published that confirmed the primary military principles of President Chavez. Reported in *Panorama*, April 27, 2005.

5. *Ibid.* Also see Andrés Benavente Urbina and Julio Alberto Cirino, *La democracia defraudada (Democracy Defrauded)*, Buenos Aires: Grito Sagrado, 2005; Arturo Contreras Polgatti, *Conflicto y guerra en la post modernidad (Conflict and War in the Post Modern Era)*, Santiago: Mago Editores, 2004.

6. "War of All the People" is another translation of Hugo Chavez's words in this context. Thus, we interchangeably use 4th Generation War, Super Insurgency, People's War, and War of All the People.

7. Colonel Thomas X. Hammes, U.S. Marine Corps, "Fourth Generation Warfare," *Armed Forces Journal*, November 2004, pp. 40-44.

8. Rupert Smith, 2007, pp. 375, 415.

9. As an example of this discussion, see Amos A. Jordan, William J. Taylor, Jr., and Michael J. Mazarr, *American National Security*, 5th ed., Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999, pp. 3-46; Sam C. Sarkesian, *U.S. National Security: Policymakers, Processes, and Politics*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989, pp. 7-8. Also, these terms are developed in Lars Schoultz, *National Security and United States Policy toward Latin America*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987, pp. 24-25, 143-330; Frank N. Trager and Philip S. Kronenberg, eds., *National Security and American Society*, Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1973, p. 47.

10. *Ibid.*

11. Daniel C. Esty, Jack Goldstone, Ted Robert Gurr, Barbara Harff, and Pamela T. Surko, "The State Failure Project: Early Warning Research for U.S. Foreign Policy Planning," in *Preventive Measures: Building Risk Assessment and Crisis Early Warning Systems*, eds. John L. Davies and Ted Robert Gurr, New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998.

12. Abimael Guzmán, "El Discurso del Dr. Guzmán," ("Dr. Guzman's Speech") in *Los partidos políticos en el Perú (Political Parties in Peru)*, ed., Rogger Mercado U., Lima: Ediciones Latinoamericanas, 1985, pp. 85-90; Comité Central del Partido Comunista del Perú, *Desarrollar la Guerra popular sirviendo a la revolución mundial (Developing People's War to Serve the World Revolution)*, Lima: Comité Central del Partido Comunista del Perú, 1986, pp. 82-88; Comité Central del Partido Comunista del Perú, *Bases de discusión (Bases of Discusión)*, Lima: Comité Central del Partido Comunista del Perú, 1987; "El documento oficial de Sendero" ("The Official Document of Sendero") in *Interview with Chairman Gonzalo*, ed., Rogger Mercado U., San Francisco: Red Banner Editorial House, 1998.

13. Steven D. Krasner and Carlos Pascual, "Addressing State Failure," *Foreign Affairs*, July-August 2005, pp. 153-155.

14. John T. Fishel and Max G. Manwaring, *Uncomfortable Wars Revisited*, Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2006. Also, these and subsequent assertions are based on a series of author interviews with more than 200 senior U.S. and Latin American civilian and military officials. These interviews were conducted September 1996; December 1998; November 2000; February 2001; March 2003, 2004, and 2005; and April through July 2006, in Washington, DC; Miami, FL; and various Latin American capitals. Cited hereafter as Author Interviews.

15. There is a wealth of primary source material regarding statements made by al-Qai'da and Osama bin Laden available to the public. See usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/99129502.htm.

16. Reported on *Radio Nacional de Venezuela*, September 27, 2004, and September 28, 2004. President Chavez was quoted in *El Universal*, Caracas, February 25, 2005; Europa Press, Madrid, Spain, April 3, 2005; and in *El Universal*, April 8, 2005. Also see *The Economist*, "The Chávez Machine Rolls On," December 2, 2006, pp. 41-42.

17. Esty *et al.*, 1998.

18. Author Interviews.

19. Paraphrased from Edward C. Smith and Arnold J. Zurcher, *The New Dictionary of American Politics*, New York: Barnes & Noble, Inc., 1960, pp. 352; 112-113.

20. Author Interviews.

21. *Ibid.*

22. *Ibid.*

23. *Ibid.*

24. *Ibid.*

25. Kimbra L. Fishel, "Challenging the Hegemon: Al-Qai'da's Elevation of Asymmetric Insurgent Warfare onto the Global Arena," in Robert J. Bunker, ed., *Networks, Terrorism and Global Insurgency*, London: Routledge, 2005, pp. 115-128.

26. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, Michael Howard and Peter Paret, trans. and eds., New Brunswick: Princeton University Press, [1832] 1976, p. 596.

27. There is no body of international relations literature that effectively addresses nonstate, irregular conflict at the global level. Rather, insights must be drawn from three different types of literature that range from the broadest, grand strategy level to a more specific, tactical level. (These literatures are (1) hegemonic stability/power transition: Morgenthau, 1985; Strausz-Hupe, 1953; Organski, 1958; Art and Jervis, 1973; and Brown, 1995; (2) traditional terrorism: Crenshaw, 1981 and 1995; Gilpin, 1993; Laqueur, 1996 and 1999; and Lemke, 1997 and 2002; and, (3) revolutionary/asymmetric/insurgent/guerrilla/irregular warfare: Mao, 1978; Trinquier, 1964; Guevara, 1973; Guillen, 1973; and Asprey, 1975). All three of these sets of literature focus primarily on the nation-state and conflict as defined generally in military terms. The one area of divergence in the three literatures is that the terrorism and revolutionary literatures recognize that nonstate actors can sometimes play more than bit parts in the global security arena. Nevertheless, the mainstream international relations dialogue articulates that nonstate actors are, at base, local law enforcement problems and do not require the nation-state processes of sustained, national security policy attention, Trager and Kronenberg, 1973; Sarkesian, 1989; and Jordan, Taylor, and Mazarr, 1999). It is also important to look at Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, *Unrestricted Warfare*, Beijing: PLA Literature and

Arts Publishing House, 1999; Paul E. Smith, *On Political War*, Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1989; and Chester A. Crocker, "Engaging Failed States," *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 2003, pp. 32-44.

28. *Ibid.*; Fishel, 2005.

29. Rupert Smith, 2007, pp. 275-279.

30. Steven Metz, *The Future of Insurgency*, Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, 1993.

31. Rohan Gunaretna, *Inside the al-Qai'da Global Network of Terror*, London: Hurst & Co., 2002 pp. 54, 89; Peter Bergen, *Holy War, Inc., Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden*, New York: The Free Press, 2001; and Sherifa Zuhur, *A Hundred Osamas: Islamist Threats and the Future of Counterinsurgency*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2005. Additionally, there is a wealth of primary source material regarding statements made by al-Qai'da available online at uninfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/99129502.htm.

32. Clausewitz, 1976, pp. 595-596.

33. Rupert Smith, 2007, p. 279.

34. Qiao and Wang, 1999, pp. 123-169.

35. *Ibid.*, p. 154.

36. Steven Metz and Raymond Millen, *Future Wars/Future Battle Space: The Strategic Role of American Landpower*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2003, pp. ix; 15-17.

37. Paul E. Smith, 1989, p. 3.

38. Qiao and Wang, 1999, p. 109.

39. General Sir Frank Kitson, *Warfare as a Whole*, London: Faber & Faber, 1987.

40. Zbigniew Brezezinski, *The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership*, New York: Basic Books, 2004, p. 28. Also see Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "Global Leadership after the Cold War," *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 1996, pp. 86-98; Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace*, New York: United Nations, 1992, pp. 11, 32-34.

41. Steven Metz, "Relearning Counterinsurgency," a panel discussion at the American Enterprise Institute, Washington, DC, January 10, 2005; and Paul E. Smith, 1989.

42. See Note 6. Also see Andrés Benavente Urbina and Julio Alberto Cirino, *La democracia defraudada* (Democracy Defrauded), Buenos Aires: Grito Sagrado, 2005; Arturo Contreras Polgatti, *Conflicto y Guerra en la post modernidad* (Conflict and War in the Post Modern Era), Santiago: Mago Editores, 2004.

43. J. J. Rousseau wrote: “Quiconque refusera d’obeir a la volonte generale y sera constraint par tout le corps: ce qui ne signifie autre chose sinon qu’on le forcera de’etre libre.” (“For whoever refuses to obey the general will and is unwilling to comply with the body politic, there is no other recourse than to force him to be free”). See *Contat social*, Book I, Chap. VII; and J. L. Talmon, *The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy*, New York: Praeger, 1968.

44. *Ibid.* Also see Hammes, 2004, pp. 40-44.

45. “Special Report: Hugo Chavez’s Venezuela,” *The Economist*, May 14-20, 2005, pp. 23-24; Martin Edward “Mick” Anderson, “Country Report—Venezuela,” *Countries at the Crossroads*; and “Venezuela: Politics in the Military, the Military in Politics,” *Inter-american Dialogue*, April 2006, pp. 6-8; “The Chavez Machine Roles On,” *The Economist*, December 2, 2006, 41-42; Michael Shifter, “In Search of Hugo Chavez,” *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2006, p. 46; “Chavez Victorious,” *The Economist*, December 9, 2006; Michael Shifer, *Hugo Chavez: A Test for U.S. Policy*, Washington, DC: Interamerican Dialogue, March 2007; and “Venezuela Lets Councils Bloom,” *The Washington Post*, May 16, 2007 at www.Washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/05/16AR2007051602547_2.

46. *Ibid.*; and Author Interviews.

47. *Ibid.* Also see Stephen Johnson, “South America’s Mad-TV: Hugo Chavez Makes Broadcasting a Battleground,” *The Heritage Foundation Policy Research & Analysis*, August 10, 2005; Steve Ellner, “Revolutionary and Non-Revolutionary Paths of Radical Populism: Directions of the Chavez Movement in Venezuela,” *Science and Society*, April 2005, pp. 160-190; *Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS)*, “New Regional Voice,” April 22, 2005; *FBIS*, “Expanded Telesur News Coverage Furthers Anti-US Line,” December 22, 2005; *FBIS*, “Perspective Audience,” August 5, 2006; and *FBIS*, “Telesur’s Deal with Al-Jazirah,” February 27, 2006.

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49. Patrick Markley, "Venezuelan Forces Start Training to Repel U.S."; Andy Webb-Vidal, "Chavez seeks to link Putin with Anti US Alliance," *Financial Times*, London, July 27, 2006; Alan Cullison, "Russia Reaches Out to Venezuela," *The Wall Street Journal*, July 27, 2006, p. A6; and Vladimir Torres, *The Impact of "Populism" on Social, Political, and Economic Development in the Hemisphere*, Ottawa, Canada: FOCAL Policy paper, 2006, p. 8.

50. Cirino, March 15, 2007; and "Venezuela to Buy More Weapons," *BBC News*, February 6, 2006, www.news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/hi/world/Americas/4682488.stm; Shifter, 2007; and Simon Romero, "Venezuela Spending on Arms Soars to World's Top Ranks," *The New York Times*, February 24, 2007, www.nytimes.com/2007/02/25/world/Americas/25venez.html?.

51. See Note 6.

52. Author Interviews; Barry Buzan, *People, States, and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991.

53. Jorge Verstrynge Rojas, *La Guerra Periférica y el Islam Revolucionario: Orígenes, Reglas, y Ética de la Guerra Asimétrica (Periferal [Indirect] War and Revolutionary Islam: Origins, Regulations, and Ethics of Asymmetric War)*, Special Edition for the Army of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, IDR FAN, Enlace Circular Militar, Madrid: El Viejo Topo, May 2005.

54. Qiao and Wang, 1999.

55. *Ibid.*, p. 21; Verstrynge, 2005.

56. Michael Howard, *The Lessons of History*, New Haven, CN: Yale University Press, 1991; also see Alvin and Heidi Toffler's discussion of "first-, second-, and third-wave war" in *War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century*, New York: Little, Brown, and Company, 1993.

57. Sun Tzu warned us over 2,500 years ago: "In war, numbers alone confer no advantage. Do not advance relying on sheer military power." See Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, Samuel B. Griffith, trans., London: Oxford University Press, 1963, p. 122.

58. See Note 6. Also see B. H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy*, 2d ed., rev., New York: Signet, 1974, p. 333.

59. Kitson, 1987, p. 2; Qiao and Wang, 1999, pp. 109, 123; Verstrynge Rojas, 2005.

60. *Ibid.*

61. *Ibid.*; Note 6.

62. *Ibid.*

63. Hammes, 2006, pp. 207-215; Giap, 1962, pp. 34-37. These assertions are derived from statistical tests based on interviews with civilian and military officials and scholars with direct experience in 60 low-intensity conflicts (the *SWORD Papers*). The results of this research were first published by Max G. Manwaring and John T. Fishel, in "Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency: Toward a New Analytical Approach," *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, Winter 1992, pp. 272-310, hereafter cited as *SWORD Papers*, 1992.

64. *Ibid.*; also see Urbina and Cerino, 2005, pp. 103-139.

65. *Ibid.*; Note 6.

66. Hammes, 2006; Liddle-Hart, 1974; *SWORD Papers*, 1992.

67. *Ibid.*; Sendero Luminoso's leader, Abimael Guzmán, made that statement in "El Discurso del Dr. Guzmán" ("The Speech of Dr. Guzman"), *Los partidos políticos en el Perú* (The Political Parties in Peru), Rogger Mercado U., ed., Lima: Ediciones Latinoamericanas, 1985, pp. 85-90.

68. Reported in *The New York Times*, April 6, 2007.

69. See note 6.

70. *Ibid.*; Hammes, 2006; Qaio and Wang, 1999; *SWORD Papers*, 1992.

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72. *SWORD Papers*, 1992; Qaio and Wang, 1999, p. 152.

73. *Ibid.*; Hammes, 2006.

74. Giap, 1962, p. 36. Also see Note 6.

75. Rupert Smith, 2007, p. 282; *SWORD Papers*, 1992.

76. See note 6. Also see Hammes, 2006; *SWORD Papers*, 1992 .

77. See note 6.

78. Guillen, 1973, pp. 231, 249, 253, 283.

79. *Ibid.*, pp. 284, 259.

80. *Ibid.*, pp. 230, 249, 283, 299.

81. *Ibid.*, pp. 232, 251.

82. *Ibid.*, pp. 233, 279.

83. Author Interviews and *SWORD Papers*, 1992.

84. Evidence of President Chavez's expanding horizons may be seen in a number of different activities. For example, see Fernando Baez, "On the Road with Bush and Chavez," *The New York Times*, March 11, 2007, www.nytimes.com/2007/03/11/opinion/11Baez.html?; "Iran, Venezuela To Set Up HQ for Joint Cooperation," www.iranmania.com; Steven Dudley, "Chavez in Search of Leverage," *The Miami Herald*, April 28, 2007, p. 9A; and Simon Romero, "Venezuela," *The New York Times*, February 24, 2007, www.nytimes.com/2007/03/14/world/americas/14latin.html?.

85. *Ibid.*

86. Max G. Manwaring, Conference Brief, "Hemispheric Strategic Objectives for the Next Decade," Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College and the Latin American and Caribbean Center of Florida International University, March 2004. The idea of "Wizard's Chess" is taken from J. K. Rowling, *Harry Potter and the Sorcerer's Stone*, New York: Arthur A. Levine Books, 1997, pp. 282-284. See also Max G. Manwaring, "The New Master of 'Wizard's Chess': The Real Hugo Chavez and Asymmetric Warfare," *Military Review*, September-October, 2005, pp. 40-49.

87. Hammes, 2004, pp. 40-44.

88. Steven R. David, "Saving America from the Coming Civil Wars," *Foreign Affairs*, January/February, 1999, p. 116.

89. The SWORD Model dimensions, as applicable to the populace-oriented extension, are the strength or weakness of a country's governmental institutions (i.e., the degree of a regime's legitimacy); the ability to reduce internal and external support of an illegal challenger; the type and consistency of outside support for a targeted government; the credibility of objectives and degree of organization for unity of effort; the level of discipline and capabilities of security forces; and the effectiveness of the intelligence apparatus. See Fishel and Manwaring, 2006, pp. 87-96.

90. Clausewitz, p. 596.
91. Author Interviews.
92. *Ibid.*; *SWORD Papers*, 1992; Giap, 1962, p. 34.
93. *Ibid.* Also see Max G. Manwaring, *Internal Wars: Rethinking the Problem and Response*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2001, pp. 11-13.
94. Colin S. Gray, "Deterrence and the Nature of Strategy," in Max G. Manwaring, ed., *Deterrence in the 21st Century*, London: Frank Cass, 2001, pp. 17-26.
95. *Ibid.* Also see Edwin G. Corr and Max G. Manwaring, "The Challenge of Preventive Diplomacy and Deterrence in the Global Security Environment," in Max G. Manwaring, ed., *Deterrence in the 21st Century*, 2001, pp. 124-131.
96. *Ibid.*
97. Author Interviews. Also see Rupert Smith, 2007, p. 368.
98. *Ibid.* Also see Anthony James Joes, *America and Guerrilla Warfare*, Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2000.
99. *Ibid.* Also see Harry G. Summers, Jr., *On Strategy*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1989.
100. *Ibid.* Also see "A Populace-Oriented Model for Reexamining Contemporary Threat and Response," in Fishel and Manwaring, 2006, pp. 87-96.
101. *Ibid.*
102. *Ibid.*, p. 279.
103. *Ibid.*, p. 375.
104. Clausewitz, pp. 92-93.
105. Bruce B. G. Clark, "End-State Planning: The Somalia Case," in Max G. Manwaring and William J. Olson, eds., *Managing Contemporary Conflict: Pillars of Success*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996, pp. 49-69.
106. The reality of this assertion is demonstrated in former President Bill Clinton's speech that opened the summit meeting of world leaders at the United Nations in September 2000. In that speech, he urged the leaders to prepare national and international institutions for a new age in which unilateral and international forces will have to "reach rapidly and regularly inside national boundaries to protect threatened people." Quoted in *The New*

York Times, September 7, 2000, p. 1. Also see Robert W. Komer, *Bureaucracy Does Its Thing: Institutional Constraints on US-GVN Performance in Vietnam*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1972; Max G. Manwaring, "An Interview with General John R. Galvin," in Manwaring and Fishel, eds., *Toward Responsibility in the New World Disorder*, London: Frank Cass Publishers, 1998, pp. 1-11.

107. *Ibid.*; Max G. Manwaring and Edwin G. Corr, "The 'Almost Obvious' Lessons of Peace Operations," in Manwaring and Fishel, eds., *Toward Responsibility in the New World Disorder*, pp. 196-197.

108. See, for example, the Phase 1, 2, and 3 Reports authored by Clark A. Murdock, Michele A. Flournoy, Christine E. Wormuth, Christopher A. Williams, Kurt M. Campbell, Patrick T. Henry, Pierre A. Chao, Julianne Smith, and Anne A. Witkowsky entitled "Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era," Washington, DC: Center for Strategic International Studies, March 2004, July 2005, and July 2006, available at www.csis.org/isp/bgn/reports.

109. See James R. Locher III, *Victory on the Potomac: The Goldwater-Nichols Act Unifies the Pentagon*, College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2002. The *PSNP.org* website is restructured, but information may be obtained by writing to the Project on National Security Reform, The Center for the Study of the Presidency, 1020 19th St NW, Suite 250, Washington, DC 20036.

110. Murdock *et. al*, "Beyond Goldwater-Nichols," 2004, 2005, 2006.

111. *Ibid.*; and "TF (Task Force) Irregular Challenge CSA (Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army) Outbrief," Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, June 28, 2005; and "TF Irregular Challenge DAS Decision Brief on Interagency Cadre Initiative," Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, November 27, 2006. Also see Max G. Manwaring, Wendy Fontela, Mary Grizzard, and Dennis Rempe, Preface by General James T. Hill, Commander, U.S. Southern Command, *Building Regional Security Cooperation in the Western Hemisphere: Issues and Recommendations*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2003.

112. *Ibid.*

113. *Ibid.*

114. *Ibid.*