Year |
1998 |
1999 |
2000 |
2001 |
2002 |
|
|
2003 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# households income below poverty line (1) |
|
57.60% |
60.30% |
|
72% |
|
|
|
|
Foreign investment ($MM) (2) |
1,570,708 |
|
|
|
226,526 |
|
|
|
(August) |
Unemployment (3) |
11% |
|
|
|
22% |
|
|
27% |
(1st quarter) |
Funding for Social Programs Million Bolivars (4) |
520.10 |
|
|
|
228.81 |
|
|
|
|
Devaluation (Bs/US$) (5) |
549.15 |
600.96 |
680.48 |
724.84 |
1,170.00 |
|
|
1,600.00 |
FX control |
|
1998 |
1999 |
2000 |
2001 |
2002 1st quarter |
2002 2nd quarter |
2002 3rd quarter |
|
|
|
|
|
|||||||
Economic Growth (GDP) (6) |
0.2 |
-6.1 |
3.2 |
2.7 |
-3.9 |
-9.7 |
-5.5 |
|
|
Sources of Information:
(1) "La pobreza en el trenio 1999-2001" by Matías Riutort, Chief of the Institute of Economic and social studies. Catholic University Andres Bello (UCAB). Article available in the website of the United Nations' program for development. http://www.pnud.org.ve/temas/pobreza.asp ; Article, also published in the Venezuelan Magazine "Temas de Coyuntura", No. 45, June 2002.
(2) Superintendencia de Inversiones Extranjeras
(3) "Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas", Venezuelan Central Bank; 2002: "CENDA, Centro de documentación y análisis de los trabajadores".
Centre of Analysis and Documentation of the Venezuelan workers; 2003: Lope Mendoza, President of "Conindustria". Published in the Journal "El Universal" on Feb. 14th 2003.
(4) Arthur D. Little. Information copied from the article "Chavez and the poor" by Juan Nagel. PhD Candidate in Economics, The University of Michigan, and Senior Economist, ApplEcon, LLC.
(5) Veneconomia. http://veneconomy.com/files/Indicadores/Indicador59_2864.PDF
(6) Venezuelan Central Bank.
- Venezuela has experimented with heterodox stabilization (1985-1988), shock therapy (1989-1992), gradualism (1996-1998), reforms by executive "special powers" (early 1980s, 1993-1994, 1998), reforms by negotiations with opposition parties (1996-1998), stabilization through price controls (late 1980s and 1994-1996), deep trade liberalization (1989-1993), concessions to the economic losers from trade liberalization (1994-1998) and direct subsidies to vulnerable social sectors (1990-1992) (1,2)
- 1992 coup against President Carlos Andres Perez by Hugo Chavez. Chavez is imprisoned and latter released.
- 1998 Hugo Chavez wins elections.
- 1999 Hugo Chavez holds a national referendum to call for a Parliament. Chavez dissolves the Senate and Congress and formed a transitional National Assembly. The Assembly’s task was to draft a new constitution. This transitional Assembly is now the permanent Congress.
- 1999 Hugo Chavez holds a national referendum to approve the new constitution, which was approved.
- Mr. Chavez failed to exercise the executive’s power on behalf of the people, and in the process, he ended the institutions that could guarantee democracy. As a result, the only branch of government left in Venezuela’s republic is the executive. Both the legislative and judiciary branches are now set up to respond to the President’s demands (3).
- Since 2001 there have been protests, a coup and strikes that have led the country into political, economical and social turmoil.
- With the objective to find democratic and constitutional solutions to the crisis, the Opposition (Democratic Coordinator) has been calling for referenda. Initially a Consultative Referendum was called for in 2002, which was declined because of the presence of transitional Electoral Council.
-
In May 29, 2002, and after over 6
months of a negotiation process coordinated by the
OAS, the Carter Center and the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP) and a six-nation
Group of Friends – made up of Brazil, Chile,
Mexico, Portugal, Spain and the United States; Mr.
César Gaviria said a new agreement signed by
representatives of the government and opposition
benefits all Venezuelans and opens the door for a
“peaceful, democratic, electoral and
constitutional” outcome in the politically
polarized country. (4) For full text please check
http://www.cartercenter.org/viewdoc.asp?docID=1338&submenu=news
.
- After months of negotiation between government and opposition and no final agreement, the Supreme Court appoints a National Electoral Council (CNE). The Electoral Council dictates stringent regulations for the Recall referendum against President Hugo Chavez mandate.
- November 2003, the collection of signatures for the Recall Referendum is held; the Carter Center and the OAS acted as international Observers to the signature and counting process. The CNE did not fulfill deadlines previously established to disclose the results of the process.
- According to Súmate, a non for profit organization, in charge of the signature collection process working with the CNE, 3,183,526 valid signatures were collected, 30% over the value needed – the number of signatures needed to activate the Recall Referendum is 2,436,083 signatures (5). During the signature verification process, the CNE dictated a new law that eliminated 876,000 signatures due to irregularities in the process (use of similar handwriting when filling the signature form called planillas planas) (5).
- On March 2, 2004, the Carter Center expressed that they “find sufficient controls” in the signature collection and verification process and that they “have had some discrepancies with the CNE over the verification criteria” (6). With the elimination of 876,000 signatures (nearly 28% of valid signatures), there are not enough signatures to activate the Recall Referendum against President Hugo Chavez.
- The CNE has violated several articles in the constitution (7, 8). It is illegal for the CNE to define a process for collection of signatures (art 19), Article 22 of the norms on recall referenda states that only the signature is required to be a “handwritten original”, it says nothing of the corresponding data; and the most important of all is the violation of article 24 of the constitution where no retroactive regulations can be issued in any process. It is important to note that the pro-Chavez members dominate the Board of the CNE by a three to two margin (9)
- According to Stratfor's CNE sources, many of these signatures are legitimate, and if enough pressure is applied they might be validated. OAS and Carter Center officials also are pushing hard to extend the period in which the signatures can be recertified from two to five days (10).
- People feel cheated; think the system is unfair, that the rules should not be changed on the fly. Last Friday (February 27th, 2004), during the G-15 summit in Caracas a huge opposition demonstration was met with excessive force, two people die and 40 were injured. Since then there have been continuous protests and clashes with the military police and the National Guard. Human Rights have not been respected and over one hundred people have been jailed, some without charges or due process (9).
- Since Friday (February 27th, 2004) there have been riots and protests countrywide. Until Sunday March 7th, 2004, there were unofficial reports of over 200 missing persons and political prisoners (11). People are claiming the rights
- Despite all the claims to "legality," Venezuelans know well what is happening to their country. That's why they have been committing brave acts of civil disobedience at the risk of losing their lives. Last week an unarmed protestor was allegedly shot in the back by the military. Yesterday the country's ambassador to the U.N. stepped down citing his government's disrespect for human rights. It is well past time for the Free World to make an equally forceful protest against Commandante Chavez (12).
- In view of this situation many internationally recognized institutions have published Communiqués reporting the extreme use of violence from the National Guard and the “massive violation of human rights” (13, 14).
- International Secretariat - International Society for Human Rights (ISHR), Declaration of The International Society for Human Rights And Andrei Sajarov Foundation, March 4th 2004.